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Reckoning with the Bluster of Apolitical
Jurisprudence
By DONALD E. LIVELY* and ELLEN S. PODGOR**
The path of the law, as Justice Holmes observed, is a function of
experience.' The law develops, more specifically, as an extension of val-
ues and priorities that prevail over rival ideals and preferences. Competi-
tion to influence legal principles has not always been open or fair. Until
the latter part of the nineteenth century, for instance, black persons were
denied citizenship and personhood.2 The path of the Constitution was
not a function of their experience for much of the nation's history, even
after ratification of the Civil War amendments.3 Nor was it susceptible
to influence by women, who until this century were excluded from the
political process.4
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1. Oliver W. Holmes, Address Before the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8,
1897), in 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897). While stressing the principles of tradition and history,
Holmes does note, "We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must remember that
for our purposes our only interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the present." IdL at
474.
2. The Framers accommodated the institution of slavery to effect ratification. See WIL-
LIAM W. WIECEK, THE SouRCEs OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-
1848, at 62 (1977). The original accommodation, by which the federal government would be
neutral on slavery and states would determine for themselves whether to allow it, eventually
was transformed by the Court into endorsement of slavery. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). In upholding slavery the Court determined that black persons had
"no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Id. at 407. Slavery was proscribed by
the Thirteenth Amendment in 1866. Black personhood and civil rights for constitutional pur-
poses were established by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
3. The Civil War amendments include the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slav-
ery; the Fourteenth Amendment, which guards against state abridgement of privileges and
immunities and state denial of due process and equal protection; and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, which protects the franchise from official discrimination.
4. Women were afforded voting rights by the 1920 passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX. They remain, however, an insignificant voice in the political
and judicial processes. See generally Lynn Hect Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: Time Is
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The evolution of jurisprudence, like legislative output, is defined in
significant part by societal values and allowances. Chief Justice Marshall
asserted nearly two centuries ago that it is the "province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." 5 Marshall's arrogation of
judicial authority on constitutional questions preceded by several decades
the Fourteenth Amendment's introduction and its subsequent transfor-
mation into a source of exponential jurisprudential growth.' In defining
"what the law is," the Marshall Court facilitated a nation in the Federal-
ist image.7 Judicial determination and amplification of overarching law
has been a norm of, rather than an exception to, the political process.
The exercise has included the Taney Court's identification of slavery as a
constitutionally protected concern;' the post-Reconstruction Court's
cramping of the federal interest in civil rights;9 the validation of official
segregation for half of the Fourteenth Amendment's existence;1" the
Lochner Court's diversion of the Fourteenth Amendment from its origi-
nal concern;1" the Warren Court's attention to fundamental liberties, 2
Not the Cure, Address Before Crighton University School of Law (Oct. 20, 1988), in 22
CREIGHTON L. REv. 413 (1988-89) (areas of bias in the judicial system). To achieve true
equality, it is necessary that there be a diffusion of a "world dominated by the male norm."
Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41
HASTNGS L.J. 471, 534 (1990).
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
6. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Court began to infuse the Fourteenth
Amendment with substantive meaning. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
Despite criticism of jurisprudence which has amplified the amendment in substantive terms,
most notably renderings on behalf of economic liberty during the first third of this century, it
remains a source ofjudicially discerned fundamental rights. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (sanc-
tity of family); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (liberty to elect abortion); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of privacy).
7. Marshall's federalist legacy includes opinions that broadly construed the Commerce,
Necessary and Proper, and Contracts Clauses. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat,) 518 (1819); McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also Burton Caine, Judicial Review-
Democracy Versus Constitutionality, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 297 (1983) (discussion of theory of judicial
review and its effect as espoused by John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison).
8. Taney identified slavery as a property right expressly protected by the Constitution.
See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426-40 (1857).
9. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Congress bereft of power under Fourteenth
Amendment to reach private discrimination).
10. The Court subscribed to the separate but equal doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896). Official segregation survived, pursuant to deferential standards of review,
until invalidated in the area of public education in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
11. The Court originally had recognized that the central concern of the Fourteenth
Amendment was with the civil rights and equality of black persons. The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). By the inception of the twentieth century, the amend-
ment had become more significant as a means of accounting for economic liberty. See, e.g.,
rights of the accused,13 and principles of racial equality; 4 and the Rehn-
quist Court's displacement of race-conscious remedial policies. 5
Debate over the judiciary's proper function remains animated
notwithstanding the well-established nature of an activist judiciary that is
capable of displacing the output of the political branches of government.
Expressions of concern about the judiciary being anti-democratic con-
tinue to draw scholarly and public attention despite their lack of novelty.
Robert Bork, for instance, has asserted that activism imperils the "legiti-
macy of the law itself."' 6 Even before Marbury v. Madison,7 however,
the role and reach of the judiciary were the subjects of sharp debate
within the Court itself.
In Calder v. Bull,'8 Justices Iredell and Chase argued respectively
for a more and less restrained judicial function. Iredell maintained that
reference to natural law held democratic principles captive to subjective
ideology and thus undermined the representative process.' 9 Chase as-
serted that jurisprudential accounting for natural or unenumerated rights
effectuated rather than impeded popular will.2" Over the 200 years since
Iredell and Chase debated the question, references to natural law, even if
not always acknowledged for what they are, have inspired the develop-
ment of constitutional principles. The legacy includes not only endorse-
ment of slavery and formulation of economic rights but also
identification of modern concepts of privacy and personal autonomy as
fundamental liberty interests.
Depiction of constitutional law-making as anti-democratic reflects a
sense that it generally is wrong for the judiciary to negate the work of a
popularly elected legislature. During the middle part of this century,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Meanwhile, the provision's concern with the status
and rights of black persons largely had been discounted by the tolerance of "mere discrimina-
tion," The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25, and emergence of the separate but equal doc-
trine, Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
12. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing right of
privacy as emanation of several enumerated guarantees).
13. The Warren Court, for instance, extended the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and established constitutional standards for custodial interroga-
tion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. The desegregation mandate, premised upon the notion that separate was inherently
unequal, was introduced in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See, e-g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (race-conscious
policies are suspect).
16. ROBERT H. BoR, THE TEMPTING OF AMEMCA 349 (1990).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
19. Id. at 398-400.
20. Id. at 386-90.
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however, some of the Court's most significant jurisprudential contribu-
tions responded to the reality that "discrete and insular minorities" sys-
tematically had been excluded from, and underrepresented in, the
political system.2" Equal protection theory, premised on process defect,
resulted in criteria of "suspect classification" and "rigorous review."2
"With respect to racial discrimination, judicial review ultimately trans-
lated into 'strict in theory,' and fatal in fact."23 Enhanced attention to
gender classifications enabled women to challenge and sometimes defeat
assumptions and stereotypes that traditionally had operated against
them.24 Such results may be perceived as anti-democratic to the extent
legislative output is superseded. Insofar as the Court has accounted for a
dysfunctional representative process and attempted to extrapolate results
pursuant to a political model consonant with constitutional aims, its per-
formance might be squared with the consent of all of the governed.
Notwithstanding such interventions, the judiciary cannot be aptly
criticized for deviating long or often from popular sentiment or priorities.
The Court's derogation of blacks in Dred Scott v. Sandford25 accurately
reflected racial attitudes pervading the entire nation.26 Similarly, the sep-
arate but equal doctrine operated for half of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's existence as a reflection of persistent racial chauvinism.27 Until
relatively recently, deferential review of gender classifications mirrored
the paternalistic views of a male-dominated society.2" Lochnerism de-
noted prioritization of social Darwinist values at the expense of progres-
21. The methodology of strict scrutiny originated with concern that a historically disad-
vantaged minority had been excluded from or underrepresented in the legislative process be-
cause of prejudice and thus the system was defective. See United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
22. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
23. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972).
24. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate standard of review used to
invalidate state statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and
females under the age of 18).
25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
26. The Court's observation that blacks were categorically inferior and "might justly and
lawfully be reduced to slavery," id. at 407, was described even at the time as an accurate
reflection of dominant attitudes. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTr CASE 430
(1978) (quoting Susan B. Anthony).
27. The separate but equal doctrine was subscribed to in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
550-51 (1896), and not repudiated until Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
28. As Justice Brewer stated in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908): "That woman's
physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage, in
the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood
are upon her.... Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent
upon man." Id. at 421.
[Vol. 19.715
sive economic regulation.29 The desegregation mandate reflected
eventual understanding that official separation implied racial inferiority
and denied equal educational opportunity.30 It soon was curtailed, how-
ever, by principles limiting desegregative duties.31 A determination that
education was not a fundamental right32 resulted in constitutional law
that defeated some education that was separate but equal, but accommo-
dated much more that was separate and unequal. Contemporary equal
protection criteria now reserve strict scrutiny for instances in which dis-
criminatory intent is established.3 3 Although the Court acknowledges
"this nation's sorry history of public and private discrimination,"34 its
standards of review are calibrated to defeat overt remedial preferences
but are largely unresponsive to minorities or women victimized by subtle,
disguised, or unconscious racism or sexism.35
Such performance evinces a well-established record of review that,
even if not by conscious design or manipulation, has mostly accounted
for the established order and dominant priorities. Whether the Court
could have or might still fashion a legacy more responsive to discrimina-
tion or disadvantage is a question prompted by recent debate within the
Supreme Court itself. Dissenting from the Court's allowance of racial
preferences in the federal licensing of broadcasters, Justice Kennedy
doubted the Court's capacity to distinguish between invidious and less
benign racial classifications.36 The majority's response was an expression
of confidence that it can make such distinctions in a sensitive fashion.37
Kennedy's query whether the Court is capable of distinguishing official
segregation or South African apartheid from remedial preferences3" may
be unsettling. Even more unsettling, however, is a historical record that
supports his concerns about the Court's ability to make sensitive equal
29. The Court's identification of economic liberty as a fundamental right immediately was
objected to on grounds that it held reform captive to a disputable ideology. Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95.
31. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
32. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37 (1973).
33. See, eg., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (purpose requirement unsatis-
fied in death penalty); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (necessity of a "pur-
poseful" act of discrimination).
34. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
35. Remedial preferences are overt in their favoritism and thus easily discernible by mo-
tive standards. Because discrimination against minorities is no longer formal and self-evident,
it may escape constitutional detection. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 319-27 (1987).
36. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3046 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
37. See id. at 3008 n.12.
38. See id at 3046 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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protection judgments.3 9
Although some of the Court's most notable constitutional ignomin-
ies have now been discredited," modern jurisprudence continues to elicit
misgivings over appraisal skills when discrimination, disadvantage, or di-
versity is implicated. It may be impossible to measure the impact of in-
stitutional diversification upon the law's development, but it is difficult to
imagine pluralism not benefiting from such diversification. The Court is
not a particularly well-diversified entity, at least with respect to the
breadth of its collective experience. As such, the Court has been criti-
cized for an "acute ethnocentric myopia" characterized by its inability to
comprehend how language considered indecent in some contexts may be
normative in others;41 its failure to discern how a traffic barrier routing
residents of a black neighborhood around a white neighborhood might be
racially significant, especially given the community's history of official
segregation;42 and its failure to comprehend that pregnancy is a gender-
specific condition.43
Justice Kennedy's response to the Court's perceptual deficiencies
may be to avoid any appraisal of culturally sensitive issues at all. Absti-
nence, however, may be functionally akin to a decision that assertively
endorses a challenged practice and accordingly diminishes the Constitu-
tion's significance. If quality of jurisprudential output is the concern, the
problem is reducible essentially to a matter of competence. The better
alternative, therefore, may not be disabling the institution but enhancing
its capability.
As with any entity, effectuation of institutional goals requires capa-
ble personnel. Justice Kennedy's warnings against exercising judgment
may reflect instead a need for better judgment. Constitutional law is the
function of general charter principles animated by standards of review
and doctrine crafted by the judiciary. When formulating the criteria that
39. The majority in responding to Justice Kennedy stated: "We fail to understand how
Justice Kennedy can pretend that examples of 'benign' race-conscious measures include South
African apartheid, the 'separate-but-equal' law at issue in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), and the internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry upheld in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) .... " Id. at 3008 n.12.
40. Decisions upholding slavery and official segregation, for instance, now are described
as "derelicts of constitutional law." Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L.
REv. 979, 989 (1987) (quoting PHILLIP KURLAND, PoLrIcs, THE CONSTrruToN, AND THE
WARREN COURT 186 (1970)).
41. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 147 (1981) ("[r]espondents are being
sent a clear, though sophisticated, message that because of their race, they are to stay out of
the all-white enclave.")




translate constitutional text into governing principle, personal experience
and understanding become critical to the law's development. The exist-
ence of an institution that was all white until 1968" and all male until
1981, 41 suggests that breadth of cultural experience and understanding
seldom has been a significant influence on selection of jurists and crafting
of the law itself.
Constitutional significance reflects the influence of text, history,
standards of review, and personal understanding. Terms may be fixed
but indeterminate; history may be immutable but debatable; and stan-
dards of review may be subject to development, reevaluation, and redefi-
nition. Individual perceptions of and contributions to those various
factors are critical determinations of how the law develops. This Article
will (1) identify a historical record of jurisprudence persistently favorable
to the established order and dominant priorities; (2) suggest that models
of restraint or abstinence are deceiving and inimical to constitutional de-
velopment; and (3) consider how the political process could facilitate a
broadening of jurisprudential vision and enhance accountability to a plu-
ralistic society.
I. Disadvantage and Standards of Forbearance
Disadvantage is a relative phenomenon that is both a consequence of
and opportunity for constitutional choice.' The framing of the Consti-
tution was an exercise in delineating governmental power, enhancing
economic efficiency, and sheltering designated rights and freedoms. Like
other decisionmaking processes, the chartering of the republic reflected
an ordering of priorities. Defining the civil status of a discrete class of
persons was subordinated to the overarching imperatives of forming a
union and securing ratification.47 Accommodation of slavery identified a
system that in its creation not only countenanced but negotiated and con-
stitutionalized political and economic disadvantages.
Several decades and a civil war passed before slavery was formally
rooted out of the nation's system. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
44. Thurgood Marshall's appointment to the United States Supreme Court represented
the first instance of a black Justice.
45. Sandra Day O'Connor's appointment to the United States Supreme Court represented
the first instance of a female Justice.
46. Disadvantage, even if a natural condition of humanity, may be constitutionally com-
pounded by principles and decisions that accommodate or uphold slavery, allow official segre-
gation, stress marketplace freedom, or in various ways qualify equality interests.
47. For a description of the Framers' accommodation of slavery, see FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 26, at 11-27.
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teenth Amendments were calculated, respectively, to prohibit slavery,4"
protect basic rights and liberties from state abridgements,49 and preclude
race-based deprivation of voting rights.50 Unlike its original incarnation,
the nation's charter as revised by the Reconstruction amendments ena-
bled Congress and required the judiciary to account for new federal in-
terests in civil and political freedom and equality.
Discrimination has been an especially profound cause of disadvan-
tage. Although the phenomenon was not an original concern, and its
comprehensive eradication may not have been contemplated during the
charter's revision, the Fourteenth Amendment at least has afforded a de-
parture point for reckoning with it. For the most part, however, the his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment has been defined by theories and
standards of review that either confound or selectively animate the fed-
eral interest.
The Court first reviewed the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases,"1 in which the Court disregarded recent history and
minimized the amendment's redistribution of power from the state to the
federal government. 52 Such jurisprudence reflected resistance toward au-
thority that might redefine and broaden constitutional demands of liberty
and equality.53 Although the cases did not concern racial discrimination,
the Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily con-
cerned with race-disadvantaging state action.54 Consistent with that
sense, the Court soon thereafter rejected arguments that the amendment
supported a woman's right to vote." The result was influenced not only
by understanding of the provision's history but perceptions that "[tihe
paramount destiny and mission of woman [was to] ... fulfil the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother."56 In the Civil Rights Cases57 a
decade later, the Court trimmed Congress' enforcement power under the
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
49. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
51. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
52. By determining that the privileges and immunities of national citizenship were not
enhanced or expanded by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court limited the federal interest in
providing for civil rights and equality. See id. at 74.
53. As subsequent jurisprudence disclosed, refusal to recognize a redistribution of federal
and state interest reflected concern with Congress' power "to establish a code of municipal
law." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
54. The Court doubted "whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimina-
tion against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within
the purview of this provision." The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81.
55. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
56. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
57. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Fourteenth Amendment so it could not reach private discrimination.
The Court emphasized that racial disadvantage no longer merited special
attention.58 Its analysis prefaced the separate but equal era, which de-
fined racially significant Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence until the
1950s. 59
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the Court transformed
the Fourteenth Amendment from a guarantee originally responsive to a
historically disadvantaged group to an asset of the privileged. In consec-
utive terms, the Court endorsed official segregation' ° and introduced the
notion of contractual liberty.61 The separate but equal doctrine deferred
to premises, customs and practices that the Court characterized as harm-
ful only if misunderstood by their victims.62 Jurisprudential disinterest
in racial disadvantage contrasted with the Court's animation of the Four-
teenth Amendment in ways that cramped state regulatory powers and
defeated initiatives aimed at governing employment conditions.63 Within
a few decades of its creation, the amendment had become a constitutional
mutant that compounded rather than challenged established advantage.
In Justice Harlan's words, pertinent law had become a device for advanc-
ing the interests of "a dominant race-a superior class of citizens" while
fastening "a badge of servitude" on a traditionally disadvantaged class."
Despite the Fourteenth Amendment's introduction as an agent for
leveling basic rights and opportunity, underdeveloped jurisprudence re-
mained a norm through the first half of the twentieth century. In 1903,
the Court refused to protect the constitutionally secured right to vote
against racially motivated deprivation.6" As Justice Holmes put it, any
relief the Court ordered would be ignored by state and local officials and
thus would be pointless.66 Holmes later upheld a mandatory sterilization
scheme for mentally retarded persons on grounds that "[t]hree genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough."67 In so doing, he described the equal
protection guarantee as "the usual last resort of constitutional argu-
58. Id. at 25.
59. See supra note 27.
60. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
61. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
62. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
63. Eg., Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating state
minimum wage law for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state law
against anti-union contracts); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state law
regulating bakers' working hours).
64. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560, 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903).
66. Id.
67. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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ments."68 Contemporaneously, the separate but equal doctrine evi-
denced its procrustean nature and dedicated service to the dominant
culture when a student of Chinese descent was required to attend an all-
black rather than an all-white school.69 As the Court noted in Gong
Lum v. Rice, it could not "think that the question is any different or that
any different result can be reached... where the issue is as between
white pupils and the pupils of the yellow races."70
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence during the first third of this
century actually fortified economic and social advantage instead of ac-
counting for opportunity and equality. Economic liberty was a constitu-
tional priority complemented on rare occasion by empty gestures toward
equalization of separate facilities and by deference to stereotypes. Rail-
roads were obligated to provide separate cars for blacks71 even though
few blacks had an opportunity to use them or the consequent standing to
complain if they were unavailable. Legislation limiting the working
hours of women also was upheld as consistent with perceptions of "a
disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence [that] is obvious."72
Emphasis on substantive due process and concepts of economic lib-
erty defined constitutional review until the late 1930s.73 Official segrega-
tion persisted for another two decades,74 when repudiation of the
separate but equal doctrine commenced an interval of attention to equal
opportunity and cultural realities that implied group inferiority.75 By the
1970s, equal protection was circumscribed again by jurisprudential de-
mands for proof of discriminatory purpose 76 and by a reluctance to de-
fine interests such as public benefits77 and education 78 as fundamental
68. Id at 208.
69. See Gong Lur v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1927).
70. Id at 87.
71. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914).
72. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
73. The Court eventually determined that substantive due process review was "a depar-
ture from the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the State of the
relation of employer and employed." West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397 (1937).
74. See supra note 27.
75. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (racial segregation of school
children "generates a feeling of inferiority ... in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
76. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,298 (1987) (purpose requirement unsatisfied in
death penalty challenge); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (same standard unmet in housing discrimination claim); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (same standard unmet in public employment discrimination
claim).
77. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare not a fundamental
right).
78. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37 (1973) (education
not fundamental right).
rights. From a critical perspective, delimitation of the desegregation pro-
cess reflected a sense that constitutional reckoning with accumulated ra-
cial disadvantage "had gone far enough." '79
Even as the anti-discrimination principle evolved with respect to
race after 1954,80 constitutional analysis of gender classifications re-
mained bound by a sense of the Fourteenth Amendment's historical lim-
its. Goesaert v. Cleary, which upheld a state law prohibiting most women
from working as bartenders,81 typified the Court's attention to women
under the Fourteenth Amendment through the 1960s. 2 The ruling may
have been consistent with seminal equal protection expectations reflect-
ing doubt "whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimi-
nation against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever
be held to come within the purview of this provision."83 Even if women
had "achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their preroga-
tives," the Court determined that "[t]he Constitution does not require
legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards
.... "4 The Court's eventual extension of the equal protection guarantee
to women, a group beyond the Fourteenth Amendment's original ken,"5
is similar to the Court's expansion of equal protection coverage to racial
79. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. The Court in 1954 struck down official segregation of public schools on grounds that
it caused racially stigmatic harm and impaired educational opportunity. Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). For approximately a decade and one-half after requiring
desegregation "with all deliberate speed," Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955),
th Court consistently invalidated desegregation plans as inadequate. E.g., Green v. County
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating freedom of choice plan); Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S.
198 (1965) (invalidating one grade per year plan); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (refus-
ing request to delay implementation of plan). As the Court assertively developed the desegre-
gation principle in the public school context, it also expanded the concept to defeat segregation
and racial classifications in a broad spectrum of consequences. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating anti-miscegenation law); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)
(invalidating segregation of buses). Desegregation and non-discrimination demands, beginning
in the 1970s, were qualified by evidentiary requirements necessitating proof of intentional seg-
regation or discrimination. See supra note 76, infra notes 92, 107-08, 173-76 and accompany-
ing text.
81. 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948).
82. Prior to that time, gender classifications were subject to deferential standards of re-
view applied to general economic regulation. The Court provided enhanced attention to sex-
based classifications beginning in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating preference for
males as administrators in intestate proceedings).
83. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
84. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. at 466.
85. As noted previously, the status of women was not an initial concern of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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circumstances not contemplated by the provision's architects.8 6 Unlike
the unanimity that characterized the Brown decision," enhanced review
of gender classifications prompted significant dissent.8" As a conse-
quence, standards of review for even overt gender discrimination have
been more relaxed, and constitutional results have been mixed and
unpredictable.8 9
As the Fourteenth Amendment courses through the final decade of
the twentieth century, it seems an ever-less-likely departure point for
meaningful attention to racial or any other group disadvantage. Stan-
dards requiring proof of discriminatory intent as a prerequisite for close
review of alleged race90 or gender91 discrimination have greatly dimin-
ished the prospect of successful equal protection claims, at least to the
extent that official preferences are not overt.92 The Rehnquist Court, in
particular, has foreclosed the possibility that policy may account in a
generally race-conscious fashion for the nation's heritage of discrimina-
tion.93 Jurisprudence, which a century ago precluded interference with
state discrimination9 despite the Fourteenth Amendment's establish-
ment of a contrary federal interest, now identifies and asserts national
policy to defeat state efforts that would reckon with the consequent leg-
acy.95 It also has reiterated that desegregation duties are terminal rather
86. The desegregation of public schools was ordered despite a historical record indicating
that the Framers did not contemplate such racial mixing and simultaneously had segregated
public schools in the District of Columbia.
87. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88. Justice Powell, for example, maintained that gender classifications were not a Four-
teenth Amendment concern and thus should not be closely reviewed. See Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
89. The Court thus has invalidated a gender-based admissions policy at a nursing school
over dissents that the standards were justified. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 736-38 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). The holding insisted on "needless conform-
ity," id. at 735 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and the issue itself did not present "a sex discrimina-
tion case," id. at 745 (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). The Court upheld a statutory rape
law that punishes only males who engage in prohibited acts with underage females, Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981), despite objections that it was grounded in
"sexual stereotypes," id. at 496.
90. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
91. See Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (denying challenge to
veterans preference scheme on grounds purpose to discriminate against women not
established).
92. Illegal intent is easily hidden, and a collective motive may be nonexistent. As a result,
motive-based inquiry is an impediment to constitutionally demanded change. See Daniel R.
Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. RaV. 1105, 1112-13 (1989).
93. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989) (remedial
classifications responding to societal discrimination are suspect).
94. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (deferring to reasonableness of state
police power attending to established custom).
95. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95.
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than permanent, notwithstanding reversion to functional if not formal
segregation. 96 Such results may deviate from the immediate post-Brown
era, but they appear consistent with historical norms characterized by
reticence or resistance toward a meaningful constitutional accounting for
civil disadvantage.
I1. The Illusions and Delusions of Restraint
Limiting the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment so it does not dis-
place democratic output at least facially may seem consistent with imper-
atives of judicial restraint. Despite increased influence by personnel who
publicly expound the virtues of restraint, the modem Court has proved
itself as selective in its deference to the political process as its predecessor
was a century ago. Whereas the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson repudiated
the notion of a color-blind Constitution when official segregation was
challenged,97 the Rehnquist Court has invested in racial neutrality as a
standard that confounds reckoning with the legacy of race-dependent
disadvantage. 98 Modem analysis thus varies from its antecedent, some-
times depicted as a "derelictf of constitutional law," 99 insofar as it not
merely accommodates accumulated disadvantage but impedes correc-
tional or compensatory initiatives.
As evidenced by diverging opinions even within the modem Court
with respect to what equal protection allows and prohibits, 10 the practi-
cal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a function not of textual
ordination but of competing understanding and ideology. Because expe-
rience itself is subject to diverse perceptions and understandings, life ex-
posure and values are crucial factors in the animation of principles
housed -in the Fourteenth Amendment. That reality is conditioned by
the notion that courts should exercise restraint in expounding the Consti-
tution. While concepts of judicial restraint are not reducible to a single
theory of review, they have in common the stated goal of limiting the
Court's political impact. Such principles are generally styled as analyti-
cal methodology that preserves the consent of the governed. Yet they
may foreclose an established source of input into the democratic process
especially to the extent they are unbending and dogmatic. As the post-
96. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
97. Plesy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
98. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95.
99. Meese, supra note 40, at 989.
100. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95 (plurality opinion) (equal protection forbids remedia-
tion of societal discrimination); id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring) (equal protection prohibits all
racial classifications); id. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (remediation of societal discrimina-
tion consistent with Fourteenth Amendment).
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Brown experience demonstrates, practical effectuation of desegregation
and anti-discrimination principles was attributable to Congress' eventual
determination to secure basic civil and political rights.10 1 Although the
Brown decision itself continues to be second-guessed and rationalized by
champions of restraint, 102 it was essentially a morally driven decision
that effectively catalyzed a previously unresponsive legislative process.
Foundation principles of restraint include literalism, originalism,
and neutrality. 103 The essence of literalism consists of "lay[ing] the arti-
cle of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is chal-
lenged and... decid[ing] whether the latter squares with the former."'"
Literalism is notable for its general disutility as an interpretive methodol-
ogy. For a constitutional case or controversy to arise, it is almost inevita-
ble that pertinent terms are disputable rather than self-defining.105 Given
its patent inadequacy for vitalizing critical constitutional text, it is not
surprising that strict constructionists constitute a "highly underpopu-
lated subgroup."' 1 6
The Constitution seldom speaks for itself when its meaning is con-
troverted, so the imperatives of restraint require an alternative interpre-
tive guide. Originalism is such a reference point. Unlike literalism,
identification of original intent requires probing beyond the four corners
of the Constitution itself. Like strict constructionism, however, original-
ism has major inadequacies. Motive-based inquiry is notorious for its
101. Congress authorized the Justice Department to bring desegregation actions and condi-
tioned federal school funding on compliance with the desegregation mandate. See Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-d (1988).
102. Robert Bork, for instance, suggests that the Brown decision is justifiable only because
the Court only had options that themselves were at odds with the Framers' original under-
standing. He maintains that the Court had to decide between a methodology disfavored by the
Framers or devitalization of equal protection altogether. See BoRK, supra note 16, at 82-83.
The presentation of an either or choice misses the existence of other alternatives including
insistence on maximum equalization as a means of animating the Fourteenth Amendment and
remaining faithful to original design or leaving the implementation of desegregation entirely to
the political process.
103. The concepts are the subject of comprehensive attention in Mark V. Tushnet, Follow-
ing the Rules Laid Down, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
104. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
105. Typifying the problem is the Constitution's assignment to Congress of power to regu-
late commerce between the states without defining interstate commerce. See U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. Similar difficulties exist with respect to what constitutes "unreasonable searches,"
"speedy trial," "impartial jury," "assistance of counsel," "excessive bail," "cruel and unusual
punishment," "privileges and immunities," "due process," and "equal protection."
106. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 545 (1lth ed. 1985).
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lack of productivity.107 Further, it is susceptible to ideological self-ser-
vice because collective intent may be the result of merged competing or
uncertain purposes.°10
Neutrality is presented as an interpretive methodology that ensures
apoliticism even when text and history are uncertain. Neutrality de-
mands that principle, gleaned from text or original understanding, must
be applied consistently to all like problems. 1°9 Because a principle sel-
dom applies to precisely the same circumstance that begot it,110 the judi-
ciary must consider levels of generality and degree and must exercise
judgment with respect to analogy and fitness. Demand for consistency
thus disregards or underestimates invariable debate over what contexts
and concerns are truly similar and the multiplicity and relativity of fac-
tors that may contribute to a single holding. Determination that official
segregation was unconstitutional, for instance, reflected the sense that
prescriptive separation implied inferiority and also impaired life opportu-
nity. Consideration of racial classifications establishing preferences for
remedial purposes has been inspired not by any singular or fixed premise
set by precedent. Consequently, questions about whether affirmative ac-
tion causes harmful stigma, causes unacceptable harm to individuals, or
should be accepted because it has a different purpose, invited debate
rather than consensual resolution.
At best, principles of restraint are elusive and impractical. At worst,
they may hide subjective inclinations. Critics have noted that "these ju-
dicial professions of automatism are most insistent when it is most obvi-
ous that they are being honored in the breach rather than in the
observance [and that] ... [t]hey seem to appear less often when statutes
are sustained than when they are condemned .... ." " History suggests
that demands for apoliticism and consequent methodologies of restraint
may be politically inspired. Richard Nixon's 1968 presidential cam-
paign, for instance, was grounded in part on a promise to appoint strict
constructionists to the Court. 1 2 The pledge was less a function of consti-
tutional theory than a calculated assessment of the political landscape.
107. For a detailed exposition of the futility of such review, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. See id.
109. See BORK, supra note 16, at 143-44.
110. The notion that racial classifications are suspect, for instance, emerged in the context
of discrimination against minorities but had to be reassessed in determining whether it should
govern remedial racial preferences.
111. THOMAS R. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE-
TATION 43 (1956).
112. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1986).
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Public sentiment at the time reflected significant anxiety over crime and
expanding desegregation remedies. Nixon promised Justices who would
support law and order and curb the equal protection guarantee's
reach.113 The subsequent narrowing of Miranda114 and exclusionary11
rules, endorsement of capital punishment despite gross racial disparities
in its operation,116 and evisceration of the desegregation mandate1 17 are
legacies of the Nixon presidency. More specifically and pertinently, they
are the results of a political agenda rather than some independently
grand theory of restraint.
Although ideology, perception, and experience may be critical influ-
ences on the law's development, personal conviction does not always or
necessarily translate into constitutional result. Despite his profound
moral objection to slavery, for instance, Justice Story upheld fugitive
slave legislation that accommodated the South and deepened the entire
nation's implicit endorsement of the institution." 8 The possibility that
specific understanding, values, or priorities may shape the Constitution's
meaning is enhanced, however, when they drive the judicial nomination
or confirmation process. The considerations influencing judicial appoint-
ments over the past decade belie the notion that the Court presently is
motivated by a sense of restraint and deference toward representative
processes. The Reagan Administration, which along with the Bush Ad-
ministration, is responsible for approximately two-thirds of the federal
judges now sitting,1" 9 screened prospective nominees not according to
whether they subscribed to general principles of restraint but whether
they were ideologically fit and dependable. 120 President Bush's selection
criteria for the most part mirrors the methodology employed during the
Reagan years. 2 ' Given such a focus, it is not surprising that the Rehn-
113. See id. at 24. See also BoB WOODWARD & Scorr WOODWARD, THE BRETHRmN
159-61 (1979).
114. E.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
1246 (1991).
115. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See also Alfredo Garcia, The Scope of
Police Immunity From Civil Suit Under Title 42 Section 1983 and Bivens: A Realistic Ap-
praisal, 11 WHrrnIR L. REv. 511 (1989).
116. McCleskey v. Kemp, 478 U.S. 191 (1987).
117. See infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
118. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613 (1842).
119. Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74
JUDICATURE 294 (1991).
120. See Ronald Brownstein, With or Without Supreme Court Changes, Reagan Will
Reshape the Federal Bench, 16 NAT'L J. 2338, 2340 (1984); see also Sheldon Goldman, Rea-
gan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-Term: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66 JUDICA-
TURE 335 (1983).
121. See Goldman, supra note 119, at 294-306.
quist Court's sense of restraint has vanished when affirmative action pro-
grams, 122 liberty to elect an abortion, 12
3 or associated considerations1 24
have been the object of review.
Such results suggest that jurisprudence is not steered by the political
disinterest anticipated by academic visions of restraint. From Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's pursuit of the Federalist agenda to Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's facilitation of contemporary Republican aims, apolitical
jurisprudence has established itself as a selectively implemented concept.
The manipulability of interpretive methodologies is well-evidenced
by modem establishment clause review. The historical record discloses
at least three divergent intents that prompted the Establishment Clause.
The guarantee was supported by framers and ratifters who respectively
sought a wall between church and state,125 wanted to protect state-sanc-
tioned religion from federal interference,12 6 and envisioned it as a means
of ensuring religious tolerance. 17 Chief Justice Rehnquist has identified
the Establishment Clause as a guarantee against an official religion or
favoritism for a particular sect. 1 28 Although consistent with an original
intent, his discernment does not reflect the original intent. Rehnquist has
advanced a model of review, however, that invites a heightened religious
presence and influence in political and public contexts. Among other
things, the Rehnquist formula would allow prayer and Bible readings in
school, public funding of parochial education, and any official participa-
tion with religion that did not favor or burden a particular sect.
Equally significant for judicial recruitment was George Bush's decisions to continue
the Reagan-initiated President's Committee on Federal Judicial Selections and to en-
trust its chairmanship to his close friend, White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray.
Bush's insistence on naming those who shared a conservative judicial philosophy
assures not only a continuation of the Reagan-initiated screening process, including
extensive interviewing, but placed a parallel screening process (without the personal
interviewing) at the White House level.
Id at 306.
122. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating
preferential contracting program adopted by city council); Wygant v. Board of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1986) (invalidating preferential layoff plan overwhelmingly approved by union).
123. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
124. The Court, for instance, has allowed disgruntled employees who were not parties to an
earlier litigation to challenge consent decrees imposing racially remedial policies. Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 758-59 (1989). It also has rejected a First Amendment challenge to
federal law prohibiting dissemination of abortion information at clinics receiving federal
money. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1771-76 (1991).
125. See Donald E. Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the First Amendment,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 681, 692-93 (1989).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Regardless of motivation, management of the historical record sug-
gests that restraint may be valued not for its apolitical but its political
utility. Advocacy of restraint generally accompanies criticism of activ-
ism as an unprincipled and anti-democratic function. But circumstances
and deference to the political branches are selective rather than consis-
tent, so restraint in practice may translate into activism with a hidden
agenda. Lack of candor, especially when compounded by ideologically
inspired disrespect for competing values and interests, represents a meth-
odology of review that is especially insidious and unprincipled.
The modem Court discloses an investment in judicial restraint that
seems not only selective but a foil for insensitivity that at times verges on
meanness. A glimpse of such an institutional spirit was manifested by
Justice Scalia's ill-tempered denunciation of a pro-affirmative action deci-
sion as "this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the
champion of the politically impotent."'12 9 Such rhetoric cut through the
usual bromides that at least acknowledge the sad reality of past discrimi-
nation130 and revealed ill-temper and antagonism toward policies seeking
to repair accumulated disadvantage.
In re Demos"' even more strikingly reveals a class-oriented, unchar-
itable spirit. In Demos, the Court foreclosed the filing of "frivolous"
pleadings by indigent applicants.'32 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who au-
thored the majority opinion, maintained that such filings waste judicial
resources and impede the Court's efficiency.' 33 Like any other decision,
Demos reveals priorities and values. From the dissent's perspective, the
majority allowed efficiency to outweigh even the appearance of a Court
open to all.'34 The balancing of interests discounted the reality that
many pleadings are so obviously deficient that they can be rejected by
simple form notices.' 35 Because wealthy persons also file frivolous plead-
ings,' 36 the net consequence is that poor applicants have been uniquely
excluded from the judicial process. As Justice Marshall noted, the Court
by
closing its doors today to another indigent litigant... moves ever
closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant with a meritori-
ous claim out in the cold. And with each barrier that it places in
129. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 498-500.
131. 111 S. Ct. 1569 (1991).
132. Id. at 1570.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1571 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. See id.
136. See id.
the way of indigent litigants, and with each instance in which it
castigates such litigants for having "abused the system," the Court
can only reinforce in the hearts and minds of society's less fortu-
nate members the unsettling message that their pleas are not wel-
come here.
137
Modem constitutional jurisprudence, like its antecedents, reflects
not a simple philosophy of restraint but the function of priorities, under-
standing, and ideology. Reminiscent of the Lochner Court's perform-
ance, 13 contemporary constitutional renderings are hypocritical rather
than candid about their activist roots. The results, especially when dis-
crimination or its remediation are at issue, betray not only the norms of
restraint but also the premise that "[t]here is no caste here." '139
Methodologies premised on judicial restraint present significant
risks to democratic dynamics and potential. Such methodologies may
foster, for instance, a stagnant complacency about the law. Progressive
propositions may be dismissed as impermissible, as in Lochner itself,
when in fact the restraint itself establishes a policy at odds with an honest
value structure. Theories of restraint also may deny or cramp the space
available for cultural growth and correction of past misconceptions or
ameliorating political perils to a society that is democratic in form."
Society's ability to develop and actualize its ideals is imperiled by
constitutional review that compounds a legacy of past discrimination,
whether by endorsement or by standards that make exposure and ratifi-
cation of the reality next to impossible. Despite statutory prohibition of
race and gender discrimination, and attendant constitutional attention in
varying degrees, studies show that bias remains prevalent in areas espe-
cially critical to equal protection's core meaning. Inequities define en-
forcement of the law,"' the courtroom environment, 142 the legal
137. Id. at 1571-72.
138. While invalidating a state law regulating hours of employment, the Lochner Court
observed that it would be inappropriate to "substitut[e] the judgment of the Court for that of
the legislature." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905). The transparency of the
premise was revealed, however, by the Court's announcement that "[w]e do not believe in the
soundness of the views which uphold this law." Id. at 61. Justice Holmes characterized the
decision as an extension of "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
139. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
140. The Brown decision is an especially prominent example of constitutional law evolving
contrary to original assumptions but nonetheless reflecting the development of moral
understanding.
141. See, ag., FINAL REPORT OF THE RHODE ISLAND COMMISSION ON WOMEN AND THE
COURTS 31-35 (1987) (prevalence of gender bias in court decisions, Le., sentencing, damage
awards); GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COLORADO COURTS 13-72 (1990) (including discus-
sion of advantages provided as a result of gender in areas of divorce, custody and visitation).
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education process, 143 and the law itself."4  Such disparities nonetheless
remain constitutionally insignificant insofar as the Court adheres to crite-
ria that impose the confounding task of reading minds rather than en-
courage reasonable inferences from circumstances.1 45 Even though a
recent execution represented the first instance in nearly half a century
that a white defendant was put to death for a crime against a black per-
son, 146 analysis profoundly reducing any Fourteenth Amendment inter-
est in capital punishment created legal reality dissociated from reality
itself. Contrary to imagery of restraint, such review defines the law pur-
suant to a disputable vision.
Institutional misgivings about the Court's ability to review cultur-
ally sensitive claims, when viewed in the context of politically activist
results clothed in the rhetoric of restraint, merit suspicion. Self-declared
reservations and suggestions of analytical restraint deviate from func-
tional norms that obligate the Court to draw difficult constitutional
lines. 47 Some critics of the Court's performance argue for a legislative
branch as the exclusive policy source and for a consequently diminished
142. See, eg., UTAH TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE 93-107 (1990) (noting dis-
tinctions in perceptions within the courtroom as well as lack of acceptance and credibility
offered to women); MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN
THE COURTS, reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 825, 923-46 (1989) (noting courtroom
environment for female litigants, witnesses, and attorneys as well as existence of sexual harass-
ment in the judicial system). The recent revisions to the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct pro-
vide redress when there is sexual harassment by a judge. See generally Marina Angel, Sexual
Harassment by Judges, 45 MIAMI L. REv. 817 (1991) (how new ABA prohibitions will prevent
solicitation of sexual favors by members of the judiciary).
143. See, ag., REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT-GENDER BIAS STUDY COM-
MISSION (1990) (discussion of bias in law schools); see also Marina Angel, Women In Legal
Education: What It's Like to be Part of a Perpetual First Wave, or the Case of the Disappearing
Women, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 799 (1988) (study of women in legal education).
144. See, eg., REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS,
reprinted in 15 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 11, 28-64 (1986-87).
145. See supra notes 76, 107-08 and accompanying text.
146. David Margolick, Rarity for U.S. Executions: White Dies for Killing Black, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at Al.
147. In the First Amendment area, for instance, the Court routinely classifies speech de-
spite acknowledging that the lines are not "easy to draw." In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438
n.32 (1978). Even exponents of judicial restraint are ardent line-drawers in outcome-determi-
native ways. Justice Scalia, in determining what is rooted in the nation's traditions for pur-
poses of fundamental rights analysis urges a definition of the interest at its "most specific
level." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989). The demand alters ques-
tions of privacy rights to whether a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy exists
and to whether the father of a child born of an adulterous affair has parental rights tradition-
ally respected by society. See id
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and apolitical role for the Court. 4 ' These critics underestimate how ab-
stinence from the process of differentiation and distinction diminishes the
possibility of judicial or legislative reckoning with Fourteenth Amend-
ment interests. Despite the present Court's hypocrisies and record of de-
feating democratic output and reforms at the beginning and end of this
century, maintenance of an interventionist model is essential to the inter-
ests of constitutional self-government and societal development. Com-
pared to a more active legislature, an interventionist Court can provide
protection to minority interests against the tyranny of the majority. A
judicial function capable of animating the nation's highest law enhances
the quality of attention to society's development. Such a process risks
regression, as a history that includes endorsement of slavery and segrega-
tion demonstrates. Instead of a judicial function premised on an easily
subverted ideal, processes of governance and interests in societal develop-
ment may be facilitated better by attention to the values, priorities, and
sensitivities of those who might exercise judicial responsibilities.
I. Sharpening Jurisprudential Vision
Jurisprudential quality in significant part is a reflection of the caliber
of judicial personnel. In the federal system, responsibility for judicial
appointments and at least indirectly, the quality of their output, is a func-
tion of the executive and legislative branches. The President has the con-
stitutionally assigned duty of nominating "Judges of the Supreme
Court."'14 9 Confirmation, however, is subject to the "Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate."' 150 Over the course of history, considerations influ-
encing nominations have varied. Senate input, moreover, has ranged
from deferential to rigorous examination of nominees. Notwithstanding
the variances, judicial performance in large part has been an extension of
the values that influenced appointment.
The Marshall Court, for instance, reflected the priorities of early
Federalist administrations. Presidents Washington and Adams packed
the Court with exponents of a nationalist ideology.' Consistent with
their expectations, the Marshall Court defined federal powers broadly
and assertively. Expansive definitions of the Contracts Clause, 52 the
148. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv.
641 (1990) (maintaining that attention should be directed toward creating a progressive Con-
gress and citizenry).
149. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
150. Id.
151. See HENRY ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 69-76 (1974).
152. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)
(state may not modify corporate charter without abridging Contracts Clause).
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Commerce Clause,1 53 and the Necessary and Proper Clause l"4 pitched
constitutional law toward the imperatives of national economic develop-
ment and strong central governance.
Commitment to a broad definition of federal powers was so
profound that half a century elapsed after Marbury v. MadisonI" before
the Court invalidated another act of Congress. In Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford,"6 identification of a constitutional right in slavery reflected an in-
vestment in ideology that superseded a national policy designed to
accommodate but not affirmatively support slavery. 157 The decision in-
cited outrage and resistance in the North, primarily due to the extent it
denied Congress power to determine the governance of territories and
conditions for admission as states.' 8 Insofar as it denied citizenship not
just to slaves but to all black persons, however, the ruling was a fair
reflection of a society that denied basic rights and equality in a race-
dependent fashion without regional qualification.'5 9 It was Chief Justice
Taney who observed that blacks
had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that
the Negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit.' 6°
Just as Marshall had spoken for Presidents Washington and Adams, Ta-
ney's observations fairly reflected the cultural attitudes of Jacksonian
Democrats and of an antebellum society that invested heavily in racist
ideology. 161
The Dred Scott decision was not unique in its insensitivity to racial
oppression or disadvantage, although retrospectively characterized as a
constitutional "derelictl." 162 In striking down the Civil Rights Act of
1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations,
the Court precluded Congress from regulating rigidly defined private ac-
153. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (congressional power over com-
merce extends to wherever commerce is).
154. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Necessary and Proper
Clause vests Congress with broad authority to effectuate its enumerated powers).
155. 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137 (1803).
156. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857).
157. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 380-84.
158. See id. at 428-48.
159. See id. at 428-31.
160. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 409 (1857).
161. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 226-28.
162. Meese, supra note 40, at 989.
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tion pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.16 3 In so doing, it charac-
terized racially based exclusions from public venues as "[m]ere
discriminations" and thus constitutionally insignificant. 161 Two decades
later, in Plessy v. Ferguson,161 the Court upheld official segregation. In
subscribing to the separate but equal doctrine, it emphasized that any
sense of the law as stigmatizing or otherwise harmful was a function not
of government action but of the victim's misperception.
1 66
The Plessy ruling, which Justice Harlan found as "pernicious" as
Dred Scott, 1 67 is understandable too as the reflection not only of specific
decisions and attitudes defining specific decisions but of the judicial ap-
pointment process. During the latter decades of the nineteenth century
and early part of the twentieth century, justices were selected for their
commitment to principles of economic freedom. Presidents Harrison,
Cleveland, and Taft in particular were scrupulous in nominating persons
who shared their commitment to unqualified marketplace liberty.1 6 1 tNot
surprisingly, as the country became fatigued with the problems of recon-
struction and focused on economic development, jurisprudence reflected
those values and priorities. One year after Plessy, the Court announced
that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a person's freedom to use
"all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways."1 69 The Court
thus effected the amendment's transformation from original concern with
civil rights and equality of the nation's new citizens17 to a predicate for
general economic liberty.
Brown v. Board of Education171 evidenced a departure from the
norms of inattention and unresponsiveness to discrimination and disad-
vantage. The Brown Court abandoned the Plessy premise that segrega-
tion was misunderstood by its victims, and determined that the law itself
163. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 325 (1883).
164. Id
165. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
166. Id at 551 (perception that segregation imposed stamp of inferiority was "not by rea-
son of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that con-
struction upon it.").
167. Id at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
168. See ABRAHAM, supra note 151, at 131-37.
169. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
freedom to contract "which the state legislature had no right to prevent." Id. at 591).
170. "[Ihe one pervading purpose" of the Fourteenth Amendment was to effect "the free-
dom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection
of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exer-
cised unlimited dominion over him." The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71
(1873).
171. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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connoted racial inferiority. 172 The ultimate devolution of the desegrega-
tion mandate suggests that Brown, rather than Dred Scott, is the real
constitutional "derelict." During the 1970s, the Brown principle was
qualified by the concept of de facto segregation, 173 curtailment of in-
terdistrict remedies, 74 and a determination that constitutional duties
were terminal. 175 Such doctrinal conditioning countenanced education,
especially in major urban areas, that was neither racially mixed nor
equal.
176
The demise of the desegregation mandate is especially instructive
with respect to how jurisprudence may be politically ordained. As noted
previously, 177 President Nixon promised to reshape the Court and the
direction of constitutional law. His appointments included Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, who joined a majority decision in Keyes v.
School District No. 1,178 formulating the de facto concept. 179 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist-all
Nixon appointees-introduced the limitation on interdistrict remedies in
Milliken v. Bradley, which like Keyes was a five-to-four decision. 80 Per-
sonnel decisions, especially nominating influences, thus were critical to
the Fourteenth Amendment's redefinition.
President Reagan established the most comprehensive judicial
screening process in the republic's history and committed his administra-
tion to restoring philosophic balance to the Court.'8 ' Such balance con-
sisted, however, of appointees who almost invariably were white, male,
wealthy, and/or ideologically supportive of the Reagan agenda.' 8 2 Jus-
tices Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy ascended from the process, which
172. Id. at 494-95.
173. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (conditioning duty to desegre-
gate on proof of segregative intent).
174. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (invalidating metropolitan desegregation
plan on grounds of no proof of segregative intent by suburban school districts).
175. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (no constitutional
duty to desegregate, absent showing of official discriminatory intent, if community
resegregates).
176. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (curbing of desegre-
gation principles ensures urban children "will receive the same separate and inherently une-
qual education in the future as they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past.")
177. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
178. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
179. Id. at 208.
180. 418 U.S. at 737-52.
181. Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDI-
CATuRE 313, 315 (1985).
182. Goldman, supra note 120, at 338.
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also elevated Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice,"8 3 and their influence
largely has consolidated and broadened the original Nixon agenda. Pres-
ident Bush has mostly continued the Reagan policy."8 4 Given the ideo-
logical screening responsible for the selection of a majority of the present
Court, it is not surprising that constitutional jurisprudence reflects hostil-
ity toward the rights of the accused' s5 and race-conscious remediation. 1
6
The Brown principle has been eroded further insofar as the Court has
found no constitutional interest in maintenance of its achievements.
187
What two centuries of judicial appointments disclose is that ideolog-
ically inspired appointments are normative rather than exceptional, lip-
service to restraint notwithstanding. 188 The process suggests that if atti-
tude is relevant with respect to slavery, discrimination, and its remedies,
or to economic liberty, it is appropriate also to take into account under-
standing of competing cultural interests. Over the course of the nation's
history, only one presidential administration has evidenced a commit-
ment to diversify the judiciary with respect to the race, ethnicity, and
gender of its personnel. President Carter's goal of appointing more mi-
norities and women to the bench was compromised, 8 9 however, to the
extent that no vacancies existed on the Supreme Court during his term in
office. 190 The Court that President Reagan sought to balance was an in-
stitution already incapable of apprehending the racial significance of a
traffic barrier diverting black traffic around a white neighborhood191 or
183. Justice Kennedy was appointed to the Court in 1988. Chief Justice Rehnquist was
elevated to his present post in 1986, the same year Justice Scalia was appointed to the Court.
Justice O'Connor was appointed to the Court in 1981.
184. See generally Goldman, supra note 121.
185. Decisions in the past decade have eviscerated or narrowed the exclusionary rule, Mi-
randa warnings, and the right to counsel. See, eg., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(exclusionary rule subject to good faith exception); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)
(Miranda warnings unnecessary under exigent circumstances, which are liberally considered);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (adopting strict standards for determining if
criminal defendant effectively represented by counsel).
186. See, eg., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989) (racial
classification, even if remedial, subject to strict scrutiny).
187. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, III S. Ct. 630 (1991).
188. See infra notes 151-87 and accompanying text.
189. President Carter's goal to increase pluralism on the Court was effectuated in his ap-
pointment ofjudges. In a period of four years, he appointed forty women and fifty-five blacks
to federal judgeships. Studies of male and female judges support a finding that women have
"different experiences, attitudes and perspectives than men. Such differences can affect deci-
sional, courtroom, and administrative behavior." See Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the
Bench: Vive la Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE 204 (1990); see also Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap
on the Federal Bench, 19 HoFSTRA L. REv. 171, 177-78 (1990).
190. See Brownstein, supra note 120, at 2340.
191. See Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 112-16 (1981) (barrier dividing black and white
community in historically segregated city depicted as racially neutral safety device).
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of understanding the varying usage of language among the nation's
subcultures. 192
Although common to the nomination process, 193 ideological consid-
erations are less frequently an acknowledged factor in confirmatiowdeci-
sions. The Senate's function often has been cramped by deference
pursuant to a sense that it should consider only a nominee's "training,
experience, and judicial temperament.' ' 194 Such a standard has proven
manipulable enough to obscure ideological opposition to liberals like Jus-
tice Marshall'95 and conservatives like Judge Bork.' 96 Because the Sen-
ate reflects a more representative cross-section of the electorate, real
deference enables the Chief Executive to dominate the appointment pro-
cess, at the expense of broad spectrum input and influence that might
enhance responsiveness to cultural diversity.
The case for an assertive Senate role that enhances the judiciary's
sensitivity to pluralism is fortified by the occasional instance when the
Senate has closely examined a nominee's range of social vision. In 1930,
the nomination of Judge John J. Parker was rejected in part due to per-
ceptions that he was unsympathetic to the interests of blacks and labor.
With respect to concerns that Parker's racial attitudes were a function of
prejudice, critics adverted to his race-baiting campaign tactics as a candi-
date for governor of North Carolina.' 97 Parker had described "[t]he par-
ticipation of the Negro in politics [a]s a source of evil and danger to both
races [that] is not desired by the wise men in either race or by the Repub-
lican Party of North Carolina." 19 Although the statement was rational-
ized during hearings as a necessary concession to southern political
reality, reservations proved well-placed a few decades later when Parker
attempted to preclude and then roll back the process of desegregation. 99
192. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding regulation of indecent
broadcasting).
193. Although the American Bar Association policy on screening candidates states that
"[t]he committee does not consider a prospective nominee's philosophy or idealogy." Stephen
Wermiel, Controversy Brews Behind High Marks Given to Bush Nominees for Judgeships,
WALL ST. J., May 13, 1991, at A9.
194. Joel B. Grossman & Stephen L. Wasby, The Senate and Supreme Court Nominations:
Some Reflections, 1972 DuKE L.J. 557, 559.
195. See Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Consti-
tutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. Rav. 551 (1986).
196. See BoRK, supra note 16, at 268-349.
197. See Rona Hirsch Mendelsohn, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Appointments:
The Nomination and Rejection of John J. Parker, 14 How. L.J. 105, 122 (1968).
198. Id. at 122.
199. As the swing vote in Briggs v. Elliott, Parker diverted the test of segregation's consti-
tutionality to whether schools were or would be equally funded. See Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F.
Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The Senate inquiry into the Parker nomination is a seldom-used but ef-
fective model for investigating the breadth and depth of a nominee's cul-
tural awareness. The failed nomination of Judge Bork, selected for the
Supreme Court by President Reagan, reflected in significant part concern
with the nominee's social values and sensitivities.2 "°
In 1991, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the nomination of
Judge Ryskamp to the Eleventh Circuit and did not even report it to the
floor for a full vote.2 ' Critical to the committee's action was the percep-
tion of racial and ethnic insensitivities.2 "2 Presiding over a civil rights
action by four black plaintiffs who had been mauled by police dogs, and
even though two of the parties had never been charged with a crime,
Ryskamp observed that "it might not be inappropriate to carry around a
few scars to remind you of your wrongdoing."2"3 The nominee also had
maintained his membership in a country club with a reputation for ex-
cluding blacks and Jews2"4 and had reportedly complained about the
consequences of cultural change and diversity in the community where
he resides.
20 5
The repudiation of Ryskamp's nomination reveals both the weak-
ness and potential vitality of the confirmation process. As generally exer-
cised, the Senate fumction is calibrated to discern only the most egregious
insensitivity to pluralistic imperatives. The Judiciary Committee's chair
himself noted that Ryskamp's candidacy failed because of his "dumb-
founding remarks" to "softball questioning."20 6 Even unexacting inquiry
may trip up extremely and obviously narrow-minded or inexperienced
candidates, but it allows well-coached and rehearsed nominees with simi-
lar deficiencies to pass. Senate inquiry, for instance, did not discern Jus-
tice Kennedy's lack of exposure to religious pluralism 20 7 or Justice
Scalia's sense that it is clamoring majorities rather than disadvantaged
Upon remand, however, Parker worked to blunt the desegregation mandate's operation.
Maintaining that the Constitution "forbids discrimination" but "does not require integration,"
Parker enunciated a principle that defined southern resistance to Brown. Briggs v. Elliott, 132
F.Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). A decade later, an appeals court observed that it was "not
surprising that school officials--the Briggs dictum dinned into their ears for a decade-have
not faced up to faculty integration." United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d
836, 863 (5th Cir. 1966).
200. See Meg Greenfield, Privacy and the Undressed, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1987, at 100.






207. In considering a religious display on public property, Justice Kennedy related that
"[b]efore studying this case, I had not known the full history of the menorah, and I suspect the
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minorities who deserve close attention pursuant to the equal protection
guarantee.2 °8
Although not eliciting information predictive of actual performance,
the hearings preceding Justice Thomas's confirmation at least identified
experience with, and acquaintance with, race-related discrimination and
disadvantage. 2° Such information is relevant to a confirmation decision
even pursuant to the narrowest criteria of "training, experience, and judi-
cial temperament."21 0 Legislative attention and responsiveness to a nom-
inee's cultural exposure and awareness could help correct the judiciary's
lack of representative accountability to a pluralistic society. Selection
criteria should be factored to ensure that standards of review do not de-
feat democratic reckoning with diversity or disadvantage, as was the case
in the post-Reconstruction, Lochner, and post-Brown eras.
Implicit in achieving a culturally aware bench is a legislature that
exemplifies these traits. In the Justice Clarence Thomas confirmation
process, the Senate Judiciary Committee attempted to rectify a cursory
review process that exploded when leaked to the press. 211 Sexual harass-
ment emerged as a new consideration. The Senate's lack of understand-
ing of a significant gender-related issue was evident, as was its inability to
probe a candidate on the matter. A neutral panel, perhaps similar to the
Senate's delegation of the sentencing process to the Federal Sentencing
Commission, might offer expertise in investigating a candidate's cultural
awareness and veracity, to achieve a bench that will remain accountable
to pluralistic thought. A neutral body questioning the candidate would
offer a more depoliticized process and expertise in questioning, a defi-
ciency apparent in the Senate Judiciary Committee that examined
Thomas.2 12
The Court itself has recognized that review should be enhanced
same was true of my colleagues." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 488 U.S. 816, 991 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
208. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987)
(describing white "victims" of affirmative action as outcasts of the legislative process and "po-
litically impotent").
209. Judge Thomas's use of race ("high-tech lynching") and disadvantage were arguably
for the purpose of exploitation, in response to allegations made by Professor Anita Hill who
had alleged sexual harassment by him. Richard Berke, Court Nominee Rejects Charges Laid
out in Frank Vivid Detail Against Him Before Committee, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1991, at Al.
210. See Grossman & Wasby, supra note 194, at 559 (emphasis added).
211. Neil A. Lewis, Law Professor Accuses Thomas of Sexual Harassment in 1980s, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at Al.
212. Senator Joseph Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized the defi-
ciencies in the existing process: "Maybe we need new ground rules." Neil A. Lewis, Thomas
Panel Frustrated, Ends Hearings with Talk of Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at A7.
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when government action is classified on the basis of race or gender.213
Examination of the breadth and depth of a nominee's cultural awareness
should be no less rigorous. To allow jurists who themselves must strictly
scrutinize racial and gender classifications and determine whether they
stigmatize or stereotype,214 to escape close examination of their own ere-
dentials for making such decisions is fundamentally incongruous. Fail-
ure to understand the variations of stigma, depending on who is
burdened or benefited by a classification, or uncertainty about the differ-
ences between official segregation and remedial preferences, reflects
shortcomings that undermine the Court's credibility and prestige. Such
failure and uncertainty are the products too of an institutional failure to
ask the hard and probing questions that must be pursued if jurisprudence
is to reflect society's diversity.
Conclusion
Senate inquiry in the judicial confirmation process should be di-
rected not toward whether a nominee is politically correct but whether
he or she is culturally aware. Political correctness, as history has dis-
closed, is a concern that largely has commanded presidential attention
and defined the nomination process. It is evidenced by Presidents Wash-
ington and Adams's selection of jurists committed to Federalist ideol-
ogy;215 President Grant's nomination of Justices friendly to his economic
policies;21 6 Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, and Taft's choice of judges
who would advance the tenets of social Darwinism;2"7 President
Roosevelt's nomination of Justices who would defeat Lochnerism;
218
President Reagan's emphasis on fidelity to the Republican platform;
219
and President Bush's desire for "judges who will interpret the constitu-
tion as it is written.
'220
An enhanced Senate function calculated to discern a nominee's
range of cultural experience and perception can be performed within the
bounds of the narrowest definition of its responsibility. Even minimalist
characterizations of the Senate role in the appointment process acknowl-
213. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973).
214. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
215. See ABRAHAM, supra note 151, at 69-76.
216. See LEO PFEFFER, THis HONORABLE COURT 182-85 (1965).
217. See ABRAHAM, supra note 151, at 138-51.
218. Id at 210.
219. See Brownstein, supra note 120, at 2340 (emphasis on "judges at all levels of the
judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life").
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edge the propriety of assessing experience and judicial temperament.221
An individual with limited cultural exposure or understanding may be
fair-minded, but that quality does not ensure sensitivity or acuity in as-
sessing litigants or issues rooted in unfamiliar backgrounds and circum-
stances. Nor is it likely that such a qualification is established by
resignation from exclusive clubs simultaneous with nomination to a fed-
eral judgeship.
222
Given the nature of the process, the appointment of a Justice or
judge will reflect the more favored and circumscribed agenda of the Chief
Executive. By virtue of its more broadly representative nature, the Sen-
ate is the logical forum in which to account for diversity. Such a reckon-
ing cannot be effected, however, without serious and detailed inquiry into
cultural experience and understanding. It may be a compromise of sepa-
ration of powers to ascertain how a nominee actually might resolve a
particular issue.223 Inquiry into a nominee's perception of a barrier be-
tween black and white neighborhoods, understanding of how language is
used in various cultural contexts, or appreciation of the significance of a
particular religious symbol or practice affords useful insight into a jurist's
capacity to wrestle with the constitutional problem of a culturally diverse
society or consider disadvantage in a sensitive and perceptive way. A
nominee who cannot or will not answer questions probative of cultural
experience or knowledge should be rejected. The influence of personal
education, ideology, and experience on the law may be incapable of pre-
cise measurement. So long as it is reasonable to assume a significant con-
nection between such factors and jurisprudential output, we must
examine carefully the perceptual breadth and depth concerning the plu-
ralism that the Constitution must reckon with and by which it must be
defined.
221. See Grossman & Wasby, supra note 194 and accompanying text.
222. The ability to express views on broad areas of concern does not cross the boundaries
of prejudging a specific case or controversy. As recently stated by United States District Judge
Clarence C. Newcomer, in ruling that a Pennsylvania statute was broad and vague in restrict-
ing judicial candidates in voicing their view on issues, "[t]here are an array of less restrictive
means to preserve the fact and appearance of judicial impartiality which do not impose an
unconstitutional restriction upon a judicial candidate's First Amendment rights." See WALL
ST. J., Apr. 25, 1991, B12.
223. See Lively, supra note 195, at 573.
